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After 54 Years, Supreme Court Decides Family Land Case

I’ve got a fascinating Supreme Court case to share – not a recent ruling but digs into family ties, property rights, and Hindu law. It’s called Kehar Singh (D) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. vs. Nachittar Kaur & Ors., decided on 20.08.2018, and you’ll find it under Civil Appeal No. 3264 of 2011. This is a story of a son challenging his father’s sale of ancestral land in the Court in the year 1964, only for his heirs to lose out after a 54-year legal battle, all because of a 1973 law retrospective amendment.
Factual Background:
There’s a family with a big land parcel—164 Kanals and 1 Marla, to be exact—in Village Bhamian Kalan, Tehsil Ludhiana. This isn’t just any land; it’s ancestral property, passed down through generations. The father, Pritam Singh, decides to sell it to two buyers, Tara Singh and Ajit Singh, for ₹19,500/- on April 25, 1960. The deal’s done, the sale deed’s registered, and the buyers take possession.
But Pritam’s son, Kehar Singh, isn’t having it. In 1964, he marched into court with a lawsuit, saying, “This is our family land, and you alone can’t sell it without my consent. Plus, there was no legal necessity to let it go!” He’s claiming the land is ancestral, that he’s a coparcener, and that his father overstepped his rights.
Ancestral Property:
Before we go further, let’s break this down. In Hindu law, ancestral property has been handed down from your ancestors—think great-grandfather to grandfather to father. It’s owned jointly by the family, and each member, or coparcener, has a stake in it. The head of the family, usually the father, is the Karta. He is in charge of managing this property, and he can sell it—but only if there’s a “legal necessity.” That’s things like paying off debts, keeping the family, or other must-do expenses.
Kehar’s argument is simple: “My father had no legal necessity to sell, and he didn’t even ask me. This sale shouldn’t count for my share.”
The Courtroom Trips:
This case bounces around like a ping-pong ball. First, the trial court sided with Kehar in 1966, saying the sale isn’t binding on him because there’s no legal necessity. The buyers appeal, and the first appellate court in 1968 says, “Well, there was some necessity—about ₹7,399 worth—but not the whole amount.” They tweaked the ruling so Kehar could reclaim the land after his father’s death by paying that sum.
The buyers appealed against this judgement. They take it to the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. Initially, in 1974, the High Court tossed Kehar’s suit out, citing a law change—the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Amendment Act of 1973. But then the Supreme Court steps in, saying, “Not so fast! Look at this through Hindu law, not just custom.” They send it back to the High Court for reconsideration.
In 2006, the High Court took a fresh look, and this time, they ruled for the buyers. They say Pritam, as Karta, had every right to sell, and there was a legal necessity. Kehar’s suit gets dismissed, and that’s what lands this case in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Since it was established in all the lower courts and the High Court that the land was an ancestral property, the Apex Court was left to decide on: “Was there legal necessity for Pritam to sell this land, and if so, is the sale legit?”
They start with the basics: the land’s ancestral—no one’s arguing that. Then they pull out Mulla’s Hindu Law, 22nd Edition. This book’s like the Bible for Hindu law, and they cite two key bits—Articles 254 and 241.
- Article 254 says a father, as Karta, has special powers to sell ancestral property, including to pay off his own debts, as long as those debts aren’t for illegal or immoral purposes.
- Article 241 lists what counts as legal necessity: paying government dues, family upkeep, marriage expenses of coparceners, funerals, lawsuits, and family business debt.
The buyers bring the evidence. They show Pritam had a Taccavi loan from the government and a private loan, plus he needed cash for the improvement of the family’s agricultural land, like installing a tubewell. The witness to the agreement confirmed - the government (Taccavi) loan, a mechanic talks about the tubewell costs, and another says Pritam borrowed money privately. It’s all in the sale deed, too.
The High Court buys it, and so does the Supreme Court. They say Pritam needed the money to clear debts and improve the land for the family’s sake. That’s textbook legal necessity under Article 254(2) and Article 241(a) and (g). Case closed—Kehar can’t challenge it. As a coparcener, he’s bound by the Karta’s call when the necessity is proven.
The Bottom Line:
So, what’s the moral of the story? If you’re a Karta and you’ve got a solid reason—like debts or family needs—you can sell ancestral property, and your coparceners can’t undo it if the proof holds up. Pritam’s sale to Tara and Ajit stands, and Kehar’s out of luck.
Here are all the citations from the judgment, just so you’ve got the full picture:
-Kehar Singh (D) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. vs. Nachittar Kaur & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 3264 of 2011
- Mulla’s Hindu Law, 22nd Edition, Articles 254 and 241
- Darshan Singh vs. Ram Pal Singh & Anr., AIR 1991 SC 1654

Ever had a family dispute over property? Drop a comment—I’d love to hear your take!


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